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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHARLES S. GARLETT, APPEAL BRIEF 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
-vs- Appellate Case No. 20010218-CA 
JENNIFER T. GARLETT, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PETITIONER/APPELLANT (hereinafter "Petitioner") submits the following as his brief in 
the above matter: 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Jurisdiction to review the final judgment and order herein, which are the Decree of 
Divorce and the Order Denying the Motion to Set Aside Decree or Motion for New Trial, is 
vested in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rules 
3 and 4, and Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)(h). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
The matter below is a divorce proceeding, and the orders appealed from are the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce and the ruling on Motion for 
New Trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following are the issues presented on appeal: 
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A. Did the trial court err in attributing income to the Petitioner, above the amount 
reflected on his tax returns and testimony at trial? 
B. Did the trial court err in refusing, upon motion for a new trial, or in the 
alternative, motion to set aside Decree of Divorce, to consider the paternity of 
the youngest child in issue? 
C. Did the trial court err in its distribution of the parties' property? 
D. Did the trial court err in its award of alimony? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES AND RULES 
There is no case law nor statutory authority believed by the Petitioner to be wholly 
dispositive of the issues raised on appeal. 
STANDARD OF APPEAL 
In Griffith v. Griffith, 985 P.2d 255 (Utah 1999), the Utah Supreme Court stated that if 
the Court of Appeals determines that the Findings of Fact are insufficient to support the legal 
conclusions of the trial court, the Court of Appeals should remand the matter for further 
proceedings. Id. I n formulating alimony awards, the trial court has broad discretion, and its 
decisions will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice." Watson 
v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1992) (citing Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 90 
(Utah App. 1989). The courts will not disturb a trial court's alimony award so long as the trial 
court exercised its discretion within the appropriate legal standards and "supported its decision 
with adequate findings and conclusions . . ." Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 
App. 1989). Further, the trial court is granted broad discretion on ruling on a motion for relief 
from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Birch v. Birch, 771 
P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989). See, generally Bovce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928 (Utah 1980) and 
Egan v. Egan, 560 P.2d 704 (Utah 1977). Further, where there is a doubt whether a decree 
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should be set aside, the doubt should be resolved in favor of doing so. See Interstate 
Excavating, Inc. v. Agla Development Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980). The trial court must 
make a required finding that a party is voluntarily underemployed to impute income. " . . . in 
determining whether to impute income due to other employment, the findings must address the 
clerical question of whether a drop in earnings was voluntary," Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 
1026 (Utah App. 1993). ". . .the trial court has wide discretion in property division, and its 
judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion can be demonstrated," 
(citing Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 305-306 (Utah 1988)). "The trial court is 
required to enter detail in specific findings on all material issues." Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 
P.2d877at881 (Utah App. 1995) (citing Allred v. Allred. 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App. 
1990)). 
In regard to motions for a new trial, "To succeed on such a motion, a party must 
establish: (1) the existence of newly discovered evidence which is material and competent; (2) 
if by due diligence the existence could not have been discovered and produced before trial; 
and (3) that the evidence is merely cumulative or incidental, but is substantial enough that it 
would be evidence as a reasonable likelihood of a different result," Hudema v. Carpenter, 989 
P.2d 491, 502 (Utah App. 1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from final judgment and Decree of Divorce in the Seventh Judicial 
District Court in and for Grand County, State of Utah, and an appeal from Petitioner's Motion 
for New Trial, or in the Alternative, Motion for Relief from Judgment, pursuant to Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 60(b), the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, presiding. Judge Anderson entered, 
among other things, an order regarding alimony, child support and property distribution, and 
denied the Petitioner's Motion for New Trial, or in the Alternative, Motion for Relief From 
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Judgment, citing as his primary reason that the Petitioner "has submitted no reply, nor any 
affidavit supporting his assertion that the evidence is newly discovered.'" (See Ruling on 
Motion for New Trial attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein). The Decree of 
Divorce from which this appeal arises was entered on or about February 23, 2001. A Notice of 
Appeal was timely filed on behalf of Petitioner on or about March 1, 2001. 
Petitioner filed for divorce in the trial court. Responsive pleadings were filed and the 
matter came on before the lower court for trial on June 27, 2000. The Court took the matter 
under advisement and entered its Memorandum Decision on July 10, 2000 (attached hereto as 
Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by reference). The Petitioner then filed a Motion for New 
Trial on September 25, 2000. The Respondent subsequently filed a Verified Response and 
Objection to Motion for New Trial dated October 6, 2000. The Court subsequently ruled 
thereon and entered its own order on October 26, 2000. It is from the Decree of Divorce 
(attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by reference), signed on February 23, 
2001, and prior orders in the case that the Petitioner has brought his appeal. 
There are no motions pending in the trial court pursuant to Rule 50(a) or 50(b), 52(b), 
54(b), or 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties to this action were husband and wife, having been married in 1983. There 
are three minor children at issue here: Travis Charles Garlett, born January 28, 1987; Corie 
Elizabeth Garlett, born August 15, 1990; and Taylor Hallie Garlett, born May 11, 1994. The 
parties were divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered on February 23, 2001. The trial court 
awarded the Respondent sole custody of the parties' minor children subject to the Petitioner's 
reasonable visitation pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35 (Memorandum Decision, page 2). 
At the time of trial, the evidence presented to the trial court indicated that the 
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Respondent did have a history of working various jobs. However, the Respondent had never 
worked a full-time job. No evidence was presented that would indicate that Respondent had 
any health problems that would have prevented her from working full-time, and the 
Respondent had been working part-time due to her own choice. The seasonality of her 
employment was taken into account, as well as Respondent's need to be home to care for the 
children when they were not in school. (Memorandum Decision, page 4). The trial court found 
that Petitioner's income, as reflected by his federal income tax returns from recent history, 
indicated he earned an average of $30,000.00 annually. However, the trial court found that 
Petitioner admitted to "fudging his income by $5,000.00 during at least two years from 1994 to 
1998" and, based upon the testimony of Respondent, that the family spent "$50,000.00 to 
$80,000.00" annually on personal expenses. The lower court found Petitioner was capable of 
earning at least $50,000.00 annually for purposes of calculating child support and alimony. 
(Memorandum Decision, pages 3 and 4). The trial court found, based upon the testimony and 
the evidence presented before it, the Respondent had little ability to earn more than minimum 
wage. (Memorandum Decision, page 3). This resulted in Respondent being imputed income 
of $5.15 per hour, working only 30 hours per week. (Memorandum Decision, page 4). 
The trial court made no clear findings as to the reasonable monthly living expenses for 
the Respondent, nor did the trial court articulate any clear findings as to its basis for calculating 
the original monthly living expenses for the Respondent and the minor children living with her. 
The trial court also failed to state with specificity what it determined to be the Petitioner's 
reasonable living expenses. Despite this lack of findings, however, the trial court somehow 
found the Respondent to be in need of $2,134.50 per month to cover the expenses for herself 
and her minor children. (Memorandum Decision, page 4). Moreover, the trial court stated that 
if the children can live on $2,134.50 per month, Petitioner can live on the remains of his 
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monthly income after he pays $1,650.00 per month in child support and alimony. 
(Memorandum Decision, page 5). The trial court made this determination without giving any 
indication as to how it arrived at its conclusion, nor what the court felt the Petitioner's minimal 
reasonable living and business expenses were. 
Additionally, the trial court made a ruling that the Respondent be awarded the parties' 
marital home subject to a lien of one-half (!4) of the equity value of that home in favor of 
Petitioner, to be paid to Petitioner as soon as the home was sold. The home was not to be 
sold until the youngest child in issue attains the age of 18 years or until the Respondent and 
the children move out of the house. (Memorandum Decision, pages 5 and 6). The trial court 
divided the majority of the parties' marital assets based upon what it believed to be an 
equitable or an even distribution of the dollar values of those items. However, the trial court 
divided many of the assets carte blanche indicating that they had very little value and that they 
were personal items ". . . whose value is very dependent upon their meaning to each person 
and the use each could make." (Memorandum Decision, page 6). The trial court found that 
the Respondent should be awarded virtually all the home furnishings and the Petitioner be 
awarded all the sporting goods, with the exception that the Respondent be awarded a 
computer and leased Chevrolet Suburban. The other items of significant value were a 1995 
boat and trailer with a net value of $4,000.00, a camp trailer with a net value of $6,500.00, and 
a vacant lot with a net value of $18,000.00. The boat and the trailer with the camper were 
awarded to Petitioner. The vacant lot was to be sold with the first $10,500.00 of the sale 
proceeds, after payment of any debts and the sale costs, to be paid to Respondent. The 
balance would then be divided between the parties. (Memorandum Decision, pages 6 and 7). 
In making this award the court held that most of the items of personal property and home 
furnishings are of very little value, including many items of cabinetry and woodworking that 
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were handcrafted by Petitioner, which left the Petitioner with none of the home furnishings. It 
awarded all the home furnishings to the Respondent from a marriage that lasted over 16 
years. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to establish an adequate basis or detailed 
findings for imputing income to the Petitioner of $50,000.00 annually. No findings were 
made in the record in regard to reasonable business expenses of the Petitioner, nor 
were any findings made on the record that the Petitioner was voluntarily 
underemployed. Furthermore, the trial court failed to enter clear findings to establish 
what the parties' standard of living had been during the marriage for purposes of 
calculating their gross income, instead of merely stating that there was a range of 
$30,000.00 annually per the Petitioner's tax returns and up to $80,000.00 annually per 
the Respondent's allegations and testimony. The trial court found that $50,000.00 was 
appropriate without stating the basis for the $50,000.00 finding. 
2. The trial court abused its discretion in denying the Petitioner's Motion for New Trial, or 
in the Alternative, the Petitioner's Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60(b). The trial court's findings failed to make specific 
findings as to why the court felt Petitioner had not met his burden of showing the 
evidence of the DNA testing was newly discovered and was in error. Further, the trial 
court failed to address the Petitioner's Alternative Rule 60(b) argument that the 
Petitioner, pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), should or should not be 
relieved from judgment due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. 
3. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to award any of the home furnishings 
whatsoever to the Petitioner thereby forcing the Petitioner to refurnish whatever home 
7 
he was able to acquire in the future with virtually none of the home furnishings that 
were mutually acquired by the parties over the course of a 16 year marriage. 
4. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to establish an adequate basis for the 
amount of alimony awarded to the Respondent in the sum of $600.00 per month for a 
period of 16 years. No findings were made on the record demonstrating how the court 
determined the needs of the Respondent, the ability of the Respondent to meet those 
needs, or the Petitioner's ability to pay alimony. The trial court failed in its findings to 
establish what the parties' standard of living had been during the marriage, making 
further alimony determinations impossible to calculate. The trial court, additionally, 
failed to enter sufficient findings indicating what deductions the Petitioner should be 
allowed from his business in order to arrive at an income for the Petitioner upon which 
a calculation of alimony could be based. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCREETION 
IN ITS METHOD OF IMPUTING INCOME TO 
THE PETITIONER FOR PURPOSES OF 
CALCULATING CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY. 
A. Marshaling the Evidence. 
The Petitioner is well aware of his obligation to this Court to marshal the evidence and 
to address his position to the court's findings. Petitioner will do so here: 
As stated in Breinholt 
A trial court is accorded "considerable discretion in adjusting the 
financial interest of divorced parties and, thus, the court's actions 
are entitled to presumption of validity (citing Allred v. Allred, 797 
P.2d 1108, 1111 (UtahApp. 1990) (quoting Hansen v. Hansen, 
736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah App. 1987)), . . . additionally, a trial 
court is required to enter detailed and specific findings on all 
material issues which must be considered when making a child 
support award (citing Allred, 797 P.2d at 1111). If it fails to do so, 
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we will reverse "unless the facts of the record are clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor 
of the judgment" (quoting Jeffries v. Jeffries, 752 P.2d 909, 911 
(Utah App. 1988) (quoting Acton v. J.B. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 
999 (Utah 1987). Findings are adequate if they are "detailed and 
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue is reached" (quoting 
Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah App. 1988) 
(quoting Acton, 737 P.2d at 999). 
id. at 882-883. 
B. The Trial Court Failed to Make Detailed Findings Regarding 
Petitioner's Income. 
In the case at bar, no such detailed findings were provided by the trial court in its 
decision. The record of trial indicates that much was made in regard to the reputation of the 
Petitioner and testimony was received indicating that the Respondent merely believed 
personally that the Petitioner and Respondent earned between $50,000.00 and $80,000.00 
per year (R.O.T., page 163, at lines 24 and 25, and page 164 at lines 1 and 2). Additionally, 
the Respondent testified as follows: 
Q. (BY MZ. MORGAN): Okay. And I'm gonna give you a copy of 
what's been marked as NO. 12. Can you identify that document 
that is on top of the stack of bank statements? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. It is a spreadsheet of all the deposits that 
were made in our joint account. 
Q. And it starts out July of '95; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And, ah, it shows that $150-approximately $152,000.00 was 
deposited in the second half of 1995? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How much of that money do you believe went towards the 
household in supporting the family? 
A. In '95? Or just in general throughout all of it? 
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Q. In general, throughout all the years. 
A. Oh, uh, I am not real good with figures, but Chuck and I, we 
lived fairly well. 
(R.O.T., page 163, at lines 10 through 25). Besides the Respondent's mere "belief," the 
financial declarations of the parties and the spreadsheet of the deposits (which apparently 
included all business income before business expenses), no other evidence was considered 
by the trial court in determining the Petitioner's income. However, in the Memorandum 
Decision and in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law signed by the trial court, it makes 
no indication as to how it considered any of this information. The significance of any of this 
information is left to speculation. The court went on to say in its Memorandum Decision that 
"the court has heard testimony about the possessions accumulated by Chuck and Jennifer, as 
well as their lifestyle, it finds Jennifer's position better supported by that evidence." 
(Memorandum Decision, page 3). However, the court failed to state with any specificity what 
specific evidence and testimony the court found to be persuasive in arriving at its very specific 
figure of $50,000.00 per year in income for the Respondent. 
C. The Trial Court Failed to Establish Its Threshold Finding that 
Petitioner is Voluntarily Underemployed. 
The Court of Appeals in Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993) was faced with a 
similar situation. The appellant in that case was employed several years prior in the computer 
industry in California and earned $55,000.00 annually. Later, the appellant moved to Utah and 
began working as a software developer and computer consultant and continued to do so 
during the last three years of the parties' marriage. His gross earnings for the years 1988, 
1989, and 1990 averaged in excess of $100,000.00 per year, with average monthly gross 
earnings in excess of $8,500.00 per month. Ten days prior to trial, the appellant began a new 
job in Washington, earning $40,000.00 per year, and requested at trial that the court base his 
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child support and alimony obligations on his $40,000.00 per year income, rather than on his 
recent historical earnings of approximately $100,000.00 per year. The lower court, in that 
case, noting the disparity between his current salary and his historical salary, imputed income 
based upon his historical earnings. The appellant challenged those rulings insofar as the trial 
court based those obligations on his historical income, rather than his income at time of trial. 
His argument was that the trial court erred in imputing income to him without explicitly making a 
finding that he was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. Additionally, the appellant 
challenged the trial court's decision based upon the fact that the trial court failed to make 
adequate findings assessing whether the appellant was meeting his employment potential and 
probable earnings, id. at 1023 and 1024. The appellate court found, in that case, that while 
the trial court must n o t " . . . parrot the exact language of the statute," the trial court is still 
required to make a threshold finding that a party is underemployed voluntarily before imputing 
any income, and that "the trial court abuses its discretion if it proceeds without first making the 
legislative mandated finding." Id. at 1024. Additionally, the court found, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-45-7.5(7)(b), that although the trial court had entered detailed findings 
regarding the facts considered in arriving at the amount of income to impute, the trial court still 
failed to meet the requirements of subsection (7)(a) which require a finding that there was 
voluntarily unemployment or underemployment. "The fact that the trial court entered findings 
required by §(7)(b) does not alter the fact that the trial court failed to enter any findings 
required under §(7)(a). The findings on the whole are insufficient if they omit critical findings 
required by statute." Id. at 1025. 
Additionally, the trial court in that case found that the court failed to assess the 
appellant's employment potential and probable earnings. 
As previously noted, the trial court made elaborate underlying 
findings regarding appellant's work history and prior earnings, 
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based on all tax returns and bank records, and occupational 
qualifications, based upon his employment history. Yet, the court 
made no findings, explicit or implicit, concerning "prevailing 
earnings for persons of similar background in the community" as 
required by §(7)(b). 
jd. at 1026. 
Similarly in the case at bar, the court below made no detailed findings as to Petitioner's 
underemployment, whether or not it was voluntary or reasonable, and the court made no 
specific findings as to Petitioner's income. The trial court failed to make specific findings in 
regard to finding the Petitioner's earning potential and probable earnings. The trial court failed 
to establish what reasonable business expenses Petitioner should be allowed to deduct from 
his self-employment in arriving at his gross income. "Only those expenses necessary to allow 
the business to operate at a reasonable level need to be deducted from gross receipts." See 
Breinholt 905 P.2d at 882. The trial court is generally accorded wide discretion in establishing 
the income of a person who is self-employed. However, detailed findings are required in order 
to ensure the calculations are adequate. 
Thus, in order for this court to ensure that the trial court's 
calculation of Plaintiffs gross income was rationally based, the 
specific and detailed findings of fact on the issue are necessary. . 
. . However, the court made no findings regarding the necessary 
expenses of business, which was a highly contested issue 
between the parties. The lack of specific findings on this critical 
issue and in absence of the clear, uncontroverted record require 
that we reverse and remand the case to the trial court for specific 
findings . . . 
Id. at 882. 
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POINT 2. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN FAILING TO GRANT THE PETITIONER'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, PETITIONER'S MOTION 
FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT, 
PURSUANT TO RULE 60(b). 
A. The Trial Court Improperly Refused to Acknowledge Petitioner's 
Newly Discovered Evidence. 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows: 
( a ) . . . a new trial may be granted to any of the parties in all or 
part of the issues, for any of the following causes . . . 
(1) irregularity of the proceedings of the court, jury, or adverse 
party, or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which 
either party was prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) misconduct of the jury . . . 
(3) accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the 
application from which he could, with reasonable diligence, have 
discovered and produced at trial. 
Pursuant to Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989), the decision to grant 
a new trial lay largely in the trial court's discretion. Id. at 89, citing State v. Brown, 771 P.2d 
1093 (Utah App. 1989). However, the trial court has no discretion to grant a new trial unless 
the moving party shows at least one of the circumstances specified in Rule 59(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. These circumstances include, among others, "accident or surprise, 
which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against;" "newly discovery evidence, material 
for the party making application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have 
discovered and produced at trial;" and "insufficient evidence to justify the verdict or decision." 
So long as such a showing is not moot, we will not reverse the trial court's decision on a 
motion for a new trial absent a clear abusive discretion. Id. at 90. Further, the court held in 
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Foxley v. Foxley, 801 P.2d 155 (Utah App. 1990) that "for newly discovered evidence to 
warrant a new trial, the evidence must have a probative weight sufficient to have a probable 
effect on the result" (citing Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980)). Clearly, the 
evidence produced by the Petitioner in the case at bar would warrant ultimate relief being 
granted pursuant to the Decree of Divorce in regard to child support and, likely, the timing of 
the sale of the parties' home, since the child whose paternity is being disputed is the youngest 
child and would be the last child to turn age 18. Thus, it follows that if the minor child in 
question was not in issue between these parties, this would result in the Petitioner being 
allowed to realize his one-half (Yi) equity interest in the parties' marital home much sooner. 
B. The Trial Court Failed to Even Acknowledge the Petitioner's Request 
for Relief in the Alternative Pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for relief from a judgment, 
providing seven grounds for relief and further stating: 
The motion shall be made at a reasonable time and for reasons 
(1), (2), (3) or (4), not more than three months after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. 
Further, 
This rule does not limit the power of the court to entertain 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or 
proceeding, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. 
Id. Further, the trial court is granted broad discretion in ruling on a motion for relief from 
judgment on Rule 60(b). See, generally, Birch v. Birch, 751 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989). With 
appropriate circumstances and an interest of equity, a trial court can set aside a decree of 
divorce. See Bovce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928 (Utah 1980) and Egan v. Egan, 560 P.2d 704 
(Utah 1977). Given the timeliness of Petitioner's motion and the fact that the court can 
bifurcate the issues attendant to this divorce action and allow the divorce to remain final, the 
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Respondent will not be prejudiced by the setting aside of certain terms of the Decree of 
Divorce in this matter. In reopening the Decree of Divorce solely on the issue of paternity of 
the youngest child, it will not affect the property distribution, it will not affect other issues of 
custody, and it will not affect the issue of the possession of the parties' home. The only thing it 
will affect is the financial award of child support and the division of equity in the parties' marital 
home. 
In the case of Bovce v. Bovce, 609 P.2d 928 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court 
reversed the trial court's denial of the wife's motion to set aside the divorce decree based upon 
fraud. The wife's contention in that case was that the husband prevented her from gaining full 
knowledge of his total assets and that even though the wife may have had some degree of 
fault in not being as diligent as she might have been, her claim could not be overlooked. The 
court stated that the standard for granting 60(b) motions was as follows: 
The allowance of a vacation judgment is a creature of equity 
designed to relieve against harshness or enforcing a judgment, 
which may occur through procedural difficulties, the wrongs of the 
opposing party, or misfortune would prevent the presentation of a 
claim or defense . . . [a] an equity court. . . may exercise wide 
judicial discretion in weighing the factors of fairness and public 
convenience, and this court on appeal will reverse the trial court 
only when abuse of this discretion is clearly shown. 
The difficulty facing the trial court upon a motion to vacate the 
judgment lies in the fact that a compromise between two valid 
considerations must be selected. A rule which permits reopening 
of cases previously decided because of error or ignorance during 
the progress of the trial wherein large measure vitiate the effects 
of res judicata in creating a hardship to the successful litigant in 
causing him to prosecute this action more than once . . . ; on the 
other hand, the court is anxious to protect the losing party who 
has not had the opportunity to present his claim or defense. 
Discretion must be exercised in furtherance of justice and the 
court will incline toward granting relief in a doubtful case to the 
end that the party may have a hearing. 
Id. at 930-932. The court in Bovce went on to state that "[a] liberal standard for application of 
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Rule 60(b) in divorce cases is justified by the doctrine of the continuing jurisdiction the divorce 
court has over its decrees. Clearly, a court should modify a prior decree when interest of 
equity and fair dealing with the court and the opposing party so require." Id. at 931. 
It is a great hardship to be required to maintain the continued financial support of a 
child that is not one's own. It is an even greater hardship when the remedy is quite simple for 
the court to instigate. The trial court in this matter could recalculate child support pursuant to 
the statutory guidelines, excluding the youngest child. The evidence of the minor child's 
paternity through DNA testing is clearly admissible pursuant to the standard found in Teece v. 
Teece, 715 P.2d 106 (Utah 1986), holding that "The effect of Lord Mansfield's Rule has been 
substantially eroded by the enactment of Utah Code Ann. §78-25-18, which provides 
unequivocally that In any civil action or bastard proceeding which the parentage of a person is 
a relevant fact, the court shall order the child and alleged parents to submit the blood tests.'" 
Id. at 107. Additionally, the evidence was unavailable to the Petitioner at time of trial and could 
not reasonably be acquired by the Respondent until July 21, 2000, which was the date the 
natural father and the minor child, Taylor, submitted to genetic testing through the DNA 
Diagnostic Center. 
As stated in the Verified Response to Objection to Motion for New Trial as filed by the 
Respondent in this action, the Petitioner and Respondent had engaged in numerous 
discussions wherein the Respondent acknowledged that she did not believe the youngest child 
of the parties, Taylor, was the Petitioner's offspring. The Petitioner believed that the 
Respondent had never had any difficulty admitting that this was the case and the Petitioner felt 
fully confident that the Respondent would admit at trial that the minor child was not his. 
However, at trial, the Petitioner's counsel raised the issue in order to acknowledge to 
the court what the Petitioner believed would be an agreement of the parties, that the youngest 
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child, Taylor, was not Petitioner's, so that the court could properly consider this fact when 
making its determination in regard to child support. However, the Respondent objected, citing 
Lord Mansfield's Rule, which prohibits the parties from giving testimony which would tend to 
illegitimize a minor child. (R.O.T., page 27 at line 25, R.O.T., page 28 at lines 1-11). As stated 
earlier, the Teece court substantially eroded that rule by allowing DNA evidence to be 
presented to prove or disprove the paternity of children in court actions between their parents. 
However, because of the Petitioner's understanding that the truth would be acknowledged at 
trial, the Petitioner did not seek paternity testing. Further, Petitioner's counsel never informed 
him that it would be necessary for him to get DNA testing done, prior to trial, to prove that the 
minor child, Taylor, was another man's child. Nor did his counsel object to the invocation of 
Lord Mansfield's Rule. 
This surprise delayed the Petitioner getting DNA testing completed. At the Petitioner's 
next available opportunity, which was July 21, 2000, the Petitioner had paternity testing done. 
The results were received by the Petitioner on August 4, 2000 (attached hereto as Exhibit "D" 
and incorporated herein by reference). Said evidence was presented to the court as an exhibit 
to the Petitioner's Motion for New Trial, Or in the Alternative, Motion for Relief From Judgment. 
Pursuant to Rule 60(b), the Petitioner's neglect in not having the DNA evidence 
presented to the court at the June 27, 2000 hearing, and his counsel's neglect in the failure to 
argue about the issue, was excusable neglect. The Petitioner believed that the Respondent 
would never refute what she once acknowledged openly to the community, that the minor 
child, Taylor, was not the biological son of the Petitioner. As such, the trial court abused its 
discretion in failing to give Petitioner relief from judgment for his mistake and/or excusable 
neglect in regard to the issue of the paternity of the minor child, Taylor, pursuant to Rule 60(b). 
17 
POINT 3. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN FAILING TO STATE WITH ANY SPECIFICITY 
HOW TO ARRIVE AT ITS AWARD OF 
ALIMONY TO THE RESPONDENT. 
A. Marshaling the Evidence. 
A trial court must consider three factors in setting a reasonable award of alimony: (1) 
the financial conditions and needs of the recipient spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving 
spouse to produce a sufficient income for herself; and (3) the ability of the payor spouse to 
provide support. Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 762 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah App. 1988) (citing 
Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1987); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 
1988)). Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5 (1998) also provides the following additional factors to be 
considered by the trial court in fashioning an award of alimony: (4) the length of the marriage; 
(5) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; (6) whether 
the recipient spouse has worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and 
(7) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill 
by paying for education received by the payor spouse or by allowing the payor spouse to 
attend school during the marriage. Id. 
In addition to the factors stated above, the statute further provides in §30-3-5(7)(h) that 
"alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years the marriage 
existed . . ." id. Furthermore, §30-3-5(7)(c) states "as a general rule, the court should look at 
the standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance 
with subsection (7)(a)." id. And further, "The court may, under appropriate circumstances, 
attempt to equalize the parties' respective standard of living." Id. "If these factors have been 
considered, the trial court's alimony award will be not disturbed unless . . . such serious 
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Schindler v. Schindler, 776 
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P.2d 84, 90 (Utah App. 1989) (citing Fullmer v. Fullmer 761 P.2d 942, 950 (Utah App. 1988); 
Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1988)). 'The ultimate test of an alimony 
award is whether the party receiving alimony will be able to support him or herself as nearly as 
possible at the standard of living . . . enjoyed during the marriage." Id. (quoting English v. 
English, 565, P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977)). While the Findings of Fact stated that the 
Respondent had reasonable needs in the amount of $2,144.50 and that the Petitioner had the 
ability to pay the anticipated child support and alimony, the court went no further in discussing 
the above stated factors (Findings of Fact, ffl}15 and 16). (Attached hereto as Exhibit "E" are 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which are incorporated herein by reference). 
B. The Trial Court Failed to Make Specific Findings Regarding 
Petitioner and Respondent's Standard of Living, Respondent's 
Reasonable Needs and Petitioner's Ability to Pay. 
In the case of Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1988), the court held that it is an 
abuse of discretion to enter an alimony award without entering detailed findings regarding the 
previously stated factors for consideration of alimony which are the needs of the recipient 
spouse, the ability to meet her needs and the ability of the payor spouse to pay. Id. at 1075. 
The trial court in the case at bar was presented with evidence of the parties' standard of living 
during the marriage by financial declarations, tax returns, and the bank statements of the 
parties. While the record reflects that neither party objected to the admissibility of the other 
party's financial information and that both parties claimed inconsistencies and errors in the 
other party's expenses, the trial court made no finding as to what standard of living either party 
enjoyed during the marriage. 
Both parties are thus similarly left unable to contend whether or not the amount of 
alimony awarded to the Respondent was appropriate, due to the lack of a basis upon which 
said award was made. "We had held that the omission of a particular finding in alimony 
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awards is an abuse of discretion." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1167 at 1170 (Utah App. 1990) 
(citing Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah App. 1982)). Further, "the payor 
spouse's reasonable needs are a necessary step in determining the ability to provide support." 
Citing Breinholt v. Breinholt 905 P.2d 880 (Utah 1995) (citing Willev v. Willev, 866 P.2d 547, 
551 (Utah 1993)). 'The trial court is required to enter sufficient findings on the three 
enumerated fJonesl factors, and we will reverse if it fails to do so unless the relevant factors 
contained within the record are 'clear, uncontroverted, incapable of supporting only a finding in 
favor of judgment.'" Breinholt, 905 P.2d 880 (citing Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1213 
(Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991)). "Although each party testified 
regarding their monthly expenses, the trial court did not enter findings regarding the 
reasonableness of the expenses." Based upon this failure, "we remand for findings of each 
party's reasonable needs so that we can determine the court abused its discretion in 
considering the amount.. . of the alimony award." Breinholt at 880 (citing Willev, 866 P.2d at 
551). Therefore, the trial court in this case abused its discretion for failure to make adequate 
findings of fact. 
The trial court abused its discretion in imputing the Petitioner's income for purposes for 
calculation of alimony. As discussed above, the trial court in the case at bar imputed annual 
income of $50,000.00 to the Petitioner. (Memorandum Decision, page 3). The court heard 
testimony from the Respondent stating that she believed the Petitioner earned somewhere 
between $50,000.00 and $80,000.00, and that the parties actually used that sum for personal 
purposes. However, the Respondent also stated that she believed the Respondent's 
reasonable earnings of $18,000.00 for the six months leading up to trial were consistent with 
what the parties earned during the marriage. 
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Q. -which means Chuck has basically gone through $18,000.00 
in six months? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you think that's consistent with his prior spending habits? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And so typically that's what it takes him to run his life? 
A. Yes, it is. Chuck has been — Chuck does - there were times 
when Chuck could be very frugal and he would say 'okay. We 
need to watch our checkbook,' and we would. (ROT page 169, I 
15-24). 
Eighteen thousand dollars for six months extrapolated out to a twelve month calendar 
year is $36,000.00 per year or $3,000.00 per month, which is exactly what the Petitioner 
indicated to the trial court his income was-approximately $3,000.00 per month. However, in 
the court's Memorandum Decision, the court decided to impute $50,000.00 to the Petitioner 
without finding the Petitioner was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed and without 
consideration of the admission made by the Respondent that $18,000.00 per six months was 
the parties' standard of living during the marriage. "Imputing income to an unemployed or 
underemployed spouse in considering an alimony award is conceptually appropriate as a part 
of the determination of that spouse's ability to produce a sufficient income." Cox v. Cox, 877 
P.2d 1262, 1267 (Utah 1974) (citing Willev, 866 P.2d at 554). Further, income for such 
purposes should not be imputed until it is determined that "as a threshold matter, that income 
should be imputed because [spouse] is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed." Id. at 
1267. Cox further states: "In assessing spousal support, trial courts have appropriately relied 
on historical income rather than income at the time of divorce where a party 'has experienced 
a temporary decrease in income.'" Olsen v. Olsen, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985); 
Westenskow v. Westenskow, 562 P.2d.1256, 1257 (Utah 1977). Trial courts have also 
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appropriately relied upon historical income where a spouse "experiences unusual prosperity 
during one year." English, 565 P.2d at 412. Where a party's income later proves to be 
"seriously and permanently diminished," that party may seek a modification. Westenskow, 562 
P.2d at 1257." Id. at 1267-68. The trial court below did not comment anywhere on the record 
at trial, in the court's Memorandum Decision, or in the Findings of Fact on the basis for 
imputing income to the Petitioner higher than the $3,000.00 per month claimed in his Financial 
Declaration, on the joint tax returns, and in the testimony of both Petitioner and Respondent at 
trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the trial court in this case must be reversed based upon an abuse of 
discretion. The ruling to impute income to the Petitioner in an amount of $50,000.00 
contradicts the evidence presented before the court, and was not calculated in a manner which 
allowed for specific findings or a detailed understanding of how the court arrived at its decision. 
Further, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant the Petitioner's Motion 
for a New Trial, Or in the Alternative, Motion for Relief from Judgment, pursuant to Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure 59 and 60(b). The Petitioner timely filed a Motion for New Trial and timely 
requested relief from judgment. Said motions were improperly denied. Said denial has 
resulted in the gross inequity of Petitioner being forced to endure the burden of supporting a 
child that is not his and in being denied the right to obtain his fair share of the marital home for 
some four years until said child reaches the age of eighteen. 
Further, the property distribution in this matter is inequitable in that it prevents the 
Petitioner from keeping even one single item of household furnishings which were 
accumulated over the course of the sixteen year marriage, including several items which were 
handcrafted by the Petitioner himself. 
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Finally, the court abused its discretion in making an award of alimony which was flawed 
in a two-fold fashion: (a) it imputed income to the Petitioner without first making a threshold 
finding the Petitioner was voluntarily underemployed and without stating specifically how it 
arrived at calculating the Petitioner's income of $50,000.00 per year; and (b) it failed to state 
with any specificity its basis and method at arriving at the alimony award. The basis it should 
have used would state with specificity the needs of the recipient spouse, her ability to meet 
those needs, and the ability of the payor spouse to pay, as well as factors such as the length 
of marriage, and the standard of living the parties enjoyed during the course of their marriage. 
Both parties supplied tax returns, financial declarations, and bank statements, as well as 
elicited affirmative testimony through their counsel regarding their respective incomes and 
living expenses. However, the trial court made no detailed finding based upon that information 
as to what the standard of living or monthly needs or ability to meet those needs of the parties 
was, as is required of the trial court in order to arrive at a figure of alimony. For the above 
reasons, the Petitioner submits this appeal from the ruling of the lower court in the above-
entitled action. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 ^ d a 
, CORPORON 
I 
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